The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms

Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva; Nadi Helena Presser; Luciana Monteiro-Krebs; Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms

Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva^*

, Nadi Helena Presser

, Luciana Monteiro-Krebs

, Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo

Published in Social Sciences (Volume 14, Issue 4)

Received: 8 May 2025 Accepted: 3 June 2025 Published: 14 July 2025

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Abstract

Although symbolically defeated by the left in the 2022 presidential elections, the Brazilian far-right, institutionally represented by former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), continues to mobilize a significant portion of the electorate, repositioning its agenda within the mainstream of previously centrist and moderate politics. Given the central role of Bolsonarism (an ideological movement centered around Bolsonaro), this study aims to explore how the Brazilian far-right is adapting its narratives and rhetoric to seek greater support among voters. In this sense, we update the new uses of digital platforms and disinformation strategies adopted by the far-right parties and politicians to garner voter sympathy, especially from the center in the political spectrum. Through a Content Analysis, we identify five main manipulation tactics most commonly used on social media (Polarization, False Identity, Emotion, Defamation, and Conspiracy) associated with far-right rhetoric in the Brazilian context. In conclusion, we pointed out a change of this language, by the use of new platforms that now are playing a significant role in the way that Brazilian right and far-right actors communicate with the audience, such as a change of the topics in its traditional moral-emotional agenda, more based now in a transphobic discourse.

Published in	Social Sciences (Volume 14, Issue 4)
DOI	10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
Page(s)	371-381
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Brazilian Far-right, Bolsonarism, Disinformation Strategies, Digital Platforms

References

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Silva, K. M. F. D. C. E., Presser, N. H., Monteiro-Krebs, L., Carmo, R. F. R. D. (2025). The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Social Sciences, 14(4), 371-381. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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Silva, K. M. F. D. C. E.; Presser, N. H.; Monteiro-Krebs, L.; Carmo, R. F. R. D. The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Soc. Sci. 2025, 14(4), 371-381. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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AMA Style

Silva KMFDCE, Presser NH, Monteiro-Krebs L, Carmo RFRD. The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Soc Sci. 2025;14(4):371-381. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18,
  author = {Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva and Nadi Helena Presser and Luciana Monteiro-Krebs and Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo},
  title = {The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms
},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {14},
  number = {4},
  pages = {371-381},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20251404.18},
  abstract = {Although symbolically defeated by the left in the 2022 presidential elections, the Brazilian far-right, institutionally represented by former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), continues to mobilize a significant portion of the electorate, repositioning its agenda within the mainstream of previously centrist and moderate politics. Given the central role of Bolsonarism (an ideological movement centered around Bolsonaro), this study aims to explore how the Brazilian far-right is adapting its narratives and rhetoric to seek greater support among voters. In this sense, we update the new uses of digital platforms and disinformation strategies adopted by the far-right parties and politicians to garner voter sympathy, especially from the center in the political spectrum. Through a Content Analysis, we identify five main manipulation tactics most commonly used on social media (Polarization, False Identity, Emotion, Defamation, and Conspiracy) associated with far-right rhetoric in the Brazilian context. In conclusion, we pointed out a change of this language, by the use of new platforms that now are playing a significant role in the way that Brazilian right and far-right actors communicate with the audience, such as a change of the topics in its traditional moral-emotional agenda, more based now in a transphobic discourse.},
 year = {2025}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms

AU  - Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva
AU  - Nadi Helena Presser
AU  - Luciana Monteiro-Krebs
AU  - Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo
Y1  - 2025/07/14
PY  - 2025
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 371
EP  - 381
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
AB  - Although symbolically defeated by the left in the 2022 presidential elections, the Brazilian far-right, institutionally represented by former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), continues to mobilize a significant portion of the electorate, repositioning its agenda within the mainstream of previously centrist and moderate politics. Given the central role of Bolsonarism (an ideological movement centered around Bolsonaro), this study aims to explore how the Brazilian far-right is adapting its narratives and rhetoric to seek greater support among voters. In this sense, we update the new uses of digital platforms and disinformation strategies adopted by the far-right parties and politicians to garner voter sympathy, especially from the center in the political spectrum. Through a Content Analysis, we identify five main manipulation tactics most commonly used on social media (Polarization, False Identity, Emotion, Defamation, and Conspiracy) associated with far-right rhetoric in the Brazilian context. In conclusion, we pointed out a change of this language, by the use of new platforms that now are playing a significant role in the way that Brazilian right and far-right actors communicate with the audience, such as a change of the topics in its traditional moral-emotional agenda, more based now in a transphobic discourse.
VL  - 14
IS  - 4
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Author Information

Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva

Information Science Departament, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1152-9586
Nadi Helena Presser

Information Science Departament, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1585-117X
Luciana Monteiro-Krebs

Information Science Departament, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2882-6803
Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo

Animal Biology Departament, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio Grande do Sul, Recife, Brazil

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0926-6740

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Silva, K. M. F. D. C. E., Presser, N. H., Monteiro-Krebs, L., Carmo, R. F. R. D. (2025). The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Social Sciences, 14(4), 371-381. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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ACS Style

Silva, K. M. F. D. C. E.; Presser, N. H.; Monteiro-Krebs, L.; Carmo, R. F. R. D. The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Soc. Sci. 2025, 14(4), 371-381. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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AMA Style

Silva KMFDCE, Presser NH, Monteiro-Krebs L, Carmo RFRD. The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms. Soc Sci. 2025;14(4):371-381. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18,
  author = {Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva and Nadi Helena Presser and Luciana Monteiro-Krebs and Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo},
  title = {The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms
},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {14},
  number = {4},
  pages = {371-381},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20251404.18},
  abstract = {Although symbolically defeated by the left in the 2022 presidential elections, the Brazilian far-right, institutionally represented by former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), continues to mobilize a significant portion of the electorate, repositioning its agenda within the mainstream of previously centrist and moderate politics. Given the central role of Bolsonarism (an ideological movement centered around Bolsonaro), this study aims to explore how the Brazilian far-right is adapting its narratives and rhetoric to seek greater support among voters. In this sense, we update the new uses of digital platforms and disinformation strategies adopted by the far-right parties and politicians to garner voter sympathy, especially from the center in the political spectrum. Through a Content Analysis, we identify five main manipulation tactics most commonly used on social media (Polarization, False Identity, Emotion, Defamation, and Conspiracy) associated with far-right rhetoric in the Brazilian context. In conclusion, we pointed out a change of this language, by the use of new platforms that now are playing a significant role in the way that Brazilian right and far-right actors communicate with the audience, such as a change of the topics in its traditional moral-emotional agenda, more based now in a transphobic discourse.},
 year = {2025}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Brazilian Far-right After Bolsonaro: How New Actors Are Using Disinformation Strategies to Mobilize the Audience on Digital Platforms

AU  - Karoline Maria Fernandes da Costa e Silva
AU  - Nadi Helena Presser
AU  - Luciana Monteiro-Krebs
AU  - Rodrigo Felipe Rodrigues do Carmo
Y1  - 2025/07/14
PY  - 2025
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 371
EP  - 381
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251404.18
AB  - Although symbolically defeated by the left in the 2022 presidential elections, the Brazilian far-right, institutionally represented by former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), continues to mobilize a significant portion of the electorate, repositioning its agenda within the mainstream of previously centrist and moderate politics. Given the central role of Bolsonarism (an ideological movement centered around Bolsonaro), this study aims to explore how the Brazilian far-right is adapting its narratives and rhetoric to seek greater support among voters. In this sense, we update the new uses of digital platforms and disinformation strategies adopted by the far-right parties and politicians to garner voter sympathy, especially from the center in the political spectrum. Through a Content Analysis, we identify five main manipulation tactics most commonly used on social media (Polarization, False Identity, Emotion, Defamation, and Conspiracy) associated with far-right rhetoric in the Brazilian context. In conclusion, we pointed out a change of this language, by the use of new platforms that now are playing a significant role in the way that Brazilian right and far-right actors communicate with the audience, such as a change of the topics in its traditional moral-emotional agenda, more based now in a transphobic discourse.
VL  - 14
IS  - 4
ER  -

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