Psychology and Behavioral Sciences

Special Issue

The Logic in Cognitive Sciences: Historical Origins and Future Perspectives

  • Submission Deadline: Sep. 20, 2018
  • Status: Submission Closed
  • Lead Guest Editor: Ettore De Monte
About This Special Issue
The present issue proposal is based on historical evidence; developments in cognitive sciences are similar to previous developments in logical sciences and, in part, derive from them, especially in those fields that concern questions regarding the foundations of mathematics. This historical evidence establishes the logical and interdisciplinary nature of cognitive sciences. It suggests and proposes some important themes for investigation and research: 1) studies on the historical influences between the cognitive sciences (in each of their phases) and the logical sciences; 2) definition of the logical and rational properties of the cognitive sciences that are considered only empirical and experimental; 3) analysis of the relations between these logical and rational properties and the better known empirical and experimental properties of the cognitive sciences; 4) formulation of new cognitive models of man and new methods of research, which must be necessarily integrative and complex; 5) analysis and evaluation of the relations between the propositional/rational and the executive/experimental dimensions of the cognitive sciences.

Aims and scope

To analyze the historical relations between logic and cognitive sciences.
To understand the historical roots and analogies which show the logical character of cognitive science.
To conceive reason as a guide to the study of cognitive processes, in which logic becomes necessary.
To understand the power of integration, so that logic can help to solve some dilemmas that psychology has not yet solved, in the same way that Priest’s paraconsistent logic considers contradictions to be opportunities.
To recognize the mental use of logical domains and rationalize cognitive functioning. Thus, for example, situated and distributed cognitions can be understood to be different but equally possible modalities of the same processes.
Lead Guest Editor
  • Ettore De Monte

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

Guest Editors
  • Maria Silvia Vaccarezza

    Department of Antiquity, Philosophy and History, School of Humanities, University of Genova, Genova, Italy

  • Riccardo Brunetti

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Giacomo Samek Lodovici

    Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Philosophy, Cattolica University of Milan, Milan, Italy

  • Carmela Morabito

    Faculty of Literature and Philosophy, Tor Vergata University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Antonino Tamburello

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Michele Marsonet

    School of Humanities, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Genova, Genova, Italy

  • Claudia Navarini

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Anna Contardi

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Marco Innamorati

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Giovanni Crea

    Department of Human Sciences, Faculty of Psychology, European University of Rome, Rome, Italy

  • Luiz Henrique Santana

    Department of Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil