Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism

Stijn Bruers

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism

Stijn Bruers

Published in International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 11, Issue 3)

Received: 30 August 2023 Accepted: 14 September 2023 Published: 27 September 2023

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Abstract

Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.

Published in	International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 11, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
Page(s)	87-95
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Utilitarianism, Rights, Population Ethics, Repugnant Conclusion, Trolley Problem

References

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Stijn Bruers. (2023). Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. International Journal of Philosophy, 11(3), 87-95. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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Stijn Bruers. Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. Int. J. Philos. 2023, 11(3), 87-95. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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Stijn Bruers. Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. Int J Philos. 2023;11(3):87-95. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16,
  author = {Stijn Bruers},
  title = {Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism},
  journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {87-95},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20231103.16},
  abstract = {Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.},
 year = {2023}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism
AU  - Stijn Bruers
Y1  - 2023/09/27
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
T2  - International Journal of Philosophy
JF  - International Journal of Philosophy
JO  - International Journal of Philosophy
SP  - 87
EP  - 95
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7455
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
AB  - Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.
VL  - 11
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Stijn Bruers

Department of Economics, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

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Stijn Bruers. (2023). Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. International Journal of Philosophy, 11(3), 87-95. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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ACS Style

Stijn Bruers. Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. Int. J. Philos. 2023, 11(3), 87-95. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

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Stijn Bruers. Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism. Int J Philos. 2023;11(3):87-95. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16,
  author = {Stijn Bruers},
  title = {Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism},
  journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {87-95},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20231103.16},
  abstract = {Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.},
 year = {2023}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism
AU  - Stijn Bruers
Y1  - 2023/09/27
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
T2  - International Journal of Philosophy
JF  - International Journal of Philosophy
JO  - International Journal of Philosophy
SP  - 87
EP  - 95
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7455
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231103.16
AB  - Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.
VL  - 11
IS  - 3
ER  -

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